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Imagine	 you’re	 a	 solo	 pilot	 flying	 a	 small	 plane	 in	 Arizona.1	You’re	 wondering	
whether	 to	 take	 a	 scenic	 detour	 via	 the	 Grand	 Canyon	 en	 route	 to	 your	 final	
destination.	 You	 know	 how	 far	 you	 can	 fly	 on	 a	 full	 tank	 and	 how	 much	 fuel	
remains	 in	the	tank.	You	also	know	the	distance	from	here	to	the	Grand	Canyon	
and	 from	 there	 to	 your	 final	 destination.	 But	 you	 need	 to	 do	 some	 mental	
arithmetic	in	order	to	calculate	whether	you	have	enough	fuel	to	safely	complete	
the	 journey.	 You	 perform	 the	 calculation	 correctly	 and	 deduce	 that	 you	 have	
enough	fuel.	On	that	basis,	you	decide	to	take	the	detour.	So	far,	so	good!	
Moments	 later,	however,	 you	acquire	worrying	new	evidence	 that	you	are	
suffering	 from	hypoxia	 –	 an	 oxygen	 deficit	 that	 impairs	 cognitive	 functioning	 in	
ways	that	often	remain	undetectable	to	the	victim.	You	know	about	the	dangers	of	
hypoxia:	pilots	have	crashed	and	died	as	a	result	of	bad	decisions	made	under	its	
influence.	 You	 know	 there	 is	 a	 serious	 risk	 of	 hypoxia	when	 the	 altitude	 is	 high	
enough	and	the	cabin	pressure	 is	 low	enough.	Moreover,	your	control	panel	says	
you’re	now	 in	 the	danger	 zone.	As	 it	happens,	 this	 evidence	 is	misleading,	 since	
there	is	a	malfunction	in	the	barometer	that	measures	cabin	pressure.	The	truth	is	
that	you’re	at	no	risk	of	hypoxia,	although	there’s	no	way	you	can	know	this.	
Should	 you	 now	 reconsider	 your	 decision	 to	 take	 the	 scenic	 detour	 once	
you	acquire	this	new	evidence?	Intuitively,	you	should.	Consider	the	steadfast	pilot	
who	decides	to	stick	with	his	original	plan.	This	decision	seems	grossly	irrational.	
After	 all,	 the	 pilot	 has	 no	 way	 of	 knowing	 that	 the	 new	 evidence	 of	 hypoxia	 is	
misleading.	Moreover,	this	evidence	makes	it	likely	that	he	is	cognitively	impaired	
in	 ways	 that	 dispose	 him	 to	make	 elementary	mistakes	 in	 calculation.	 It	 seems	
reckless	to	ignore	this	possibility	in	dogmatically	maintaining	his	original	plan.	We	
know	there	is	no	risk	of	hypoxia,	of	course,	and	so	we	can	be	assured	that	the	pilot	
will	arrive	safely.	But	any	pilot	who	routinely	makes	such	decisions	in	the	face	of	
evidence	of	hypoxia	is	putting	their	own	life	in	serious	danger.	
The	 irrationality	 of	 the	 decision	 reflects	 the	 irrationality	 of	 the	 belief	 on	
which	it	is	based.	In	general,	it	is	rationally	permissible	to	believe	that	p	only	if	it’s	
rationally	permissible	to	act	on	the	premise	that	p.	And	yet	it’s	no	longer	rationally	
permissible	to	act	on	the	premise	that	you	have	enough	fuel	when	you	acquire	the	
new	evidence	 that	 you’re	hypoxic.	Hence,	 it’s	no	 longer	 rationally	permissible	 to	
believe	that	you	have	enough	fuel.	This	means	that	you	cannot	know	whether	you	
have	enough	fuel,	since	it’s	rationally	permissible	to	believe	that	p,	and	to	act	on	
																																																								
1	This	example	is	adapted	from	Elga	(2008,	2013)	and	Christensen	(2010).	
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the	 premise	 that	 p,	 whenever	 you	 know	 that	 p.2	Previously,	 however,	 you	 knew	
that	 you	had	 enough	 fuel	 by	 competently	deducing	 this	 conclusion	 from	known	
premises.	 Therefore,	 you	 must	 lose	 this	 knowledge	 when	 you	 acquire	 the	 new	
evidence	that	you	are	hypoxic.	
This	much	is	intuitively	compelling	but	theoretically	puzzling.	Why	should	
the	evidence	that	you	are	hypoxic	destroy	your	knowledge	that	you	have	enough	
fuel?	It	is	extremely	plausible	that	it	does,	but	it	is	not	easy	to	explain	how	it	does.	
After	all,	the	evidence	that	you	are	hypoxic	doesn’t	bear	directly	on	the	question	of	
whether	you	have	enough	 fuel:	 it	 isn’t	evidence	 that	you	don’t	have	enough	 fuel.	
But	 then	 how	 exactly	 does	 this	 new	 evidence	 undermine	 the	 rationality	 of	
believing	that	you	have	enough	fuel	and	thereby	destroy	your	knowledge?	
This	 is	 one	 instance	 of	 a	 more	 general	 question	 about	 the	 epistemic	
function	of	higher-order	evidence.	In	this	context,	higher-order	evidence	is	defined	
as	evidence	about	whether	your	beliefs	are	responsive	 to	your	evidence.	Suppose	
you	 know	 that	 p	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 evidence	 e,	 but	 then	 you	 subsequently	 acquire	
misleading	 higher-order	 evidence	 h	 that	 your	 belief	 is	 not	 responsive	 to	 your	
evidence.	How	does	this	higher-order	evidence	h	destroy	your	knowledge	that	p?	
And	why	is	it	now	rationally	impermissible	for	you	to	retain	your	belief	that	p	on	
the	basis	of	your	first-order	evidence	e?	
This	chapter	provides	a	critical	overview	of	several	 influential	proposals	 in	
the	 literature	 on	 higher-order	 evidence.	 I	 start	 by	 criticizing	 explanations	 that	
appeal	 to	 evidential	 defeat	 (§1),	 epistemic	 conflicts	 (§2),	 and	 unreasonable	
knowledge	 (§3).	 Next,	 I	 propose	 an	 alternative	 explanation	 that	 appeals	 to	 a	
combination	of	improper	basing	(§4)	and	non-ideal	rationality	(§5).	I	conclude	by	
summarizing	my	reasons	for	preferring	this	explanation	to	the	alternatives	(§6).	
	
1. Evidential	Defeat	
Richard	 Feldman	 (2005)	 argues	 that	 higher-order	 evidence	 functions	 as	 an	
evidential	 defeater:	 it	undermines	knowledge	by	defeating	evidence.	For	example,	
the	higher-order	evidence	that	you	are	hypoxic	undermines	your	knowledge	that	
you	 have	 enough	 fuel	 by	 defeating	 your	 first-order	 evidence	 for	 this	 conclusion.	
You	lose	your	knowledge	because	your	total	body	of	evidence	no	longer	supports	
this	conclusion.	
The	 challenge	 is	 to	 explain	 why	 the	 higher-order	 evidence	 that	 you	 are	
hypoxic	 defeats	 your	 first-order	 evidence	 that	 you	 have	 enough	 fuel.	 As	 we’ve	
already	 noted,	 your	 higher-order	 evidence	 doesn’t	 provide	 evidence	 against	 this	
conclusion,	since	hypoxia	by	itself	makes	it	no	more	or	less	probable	that	you	have	
enough	fuel.	But	then	how	can	it	defeat	your	evidence	for	this	conclusion?	
John	Pollock	 (1986)	draws	an	 influential	distinction	between	 two	kinds	of	
defeaters.	 First,	 and	most	 obviously,	 there	 are	 rebutting	 defeaters,	 which	 reduce																																																									
2	Hawthorne	and	Stanley	(2008)	endorse	both	directions	of	this	knowledge-action	
principle	 –	 that	 is,	 it’s	 rationally	 permissible	 to	 act	 on	 the	 premise	 that	p	 if	 and	
only	if	you	know	that	p	–	but	the	opposite	direction	is	more	controversial.	
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your	overall	degree	of	evidential	support	 for	a	conclusion	by	giving	you	evidence	
against	 the	 conclusion.	Crucially,	 though,	 not	 all	 defeaters	work	 this	way.	There	
are	 also	 undercutting	 defeaters,	 which	 reduce	 your	 overall	 degree	 of	 evidential	
support	for	a	conclusion	without	giving	you	evidence	against	your	conclusion.	As	
Pollock	writes,	“Such	defeaters	attack	the	connection	between	the	reason	and	the	
conclusion	rather	than	attacking	the	conclusion	itself”	(1986:	196).	
Consider	 a	 textbook	 example:	 the	 fact	 that	 the	wall	 looks	 red	 is	 evidence	
that	that	it	is	red,	although	this	evidential	connection	can	be	undercut	by	further	
evidence	 that	 the	 wall	 is	 bathed	 in	 red	 light.	 This	 is	 no	 evidence	 against	 the	
conclusion	that	the	wall	is	red,	since	the	lighting	by	itself	makes	it	no	more	or	less	
probable	 that	 the	 wall	 is	 red.	 As	 I’ll	 explain,	 however,	 it	 reduces	 the	 degree	 to	
which	your	sensory	evidence	supports	this	conclusion.	
Under	 normal	 circumstances,	 the	 most	 probable	 explanation	 of	 why	 the	
wall	 looks	red	 is	 that	 it	 is	red.	Hence,	 the	evidence	that	the	wall	 looks	red	raises	
the	probability	that	it	is	red.	Given	the	further	evidence	that	the	wall	is	bathed	in	
the	red	lighting,	however,	this	is	no	longer	the	most	probable	explanation.	In	these	
abnormal	 lighting	conditions,	 the	wall	 looks	 red	whatever	 color	 it	 is.	Hence,	 the	
evidence	 that	 the	wall	 looks	 red	 under	 red	 lighting	 doesn’t	 raise	 the	 probability	
that	the	wall	is	red.	Putting	these	points	together,	the	probability	that	the	wall	is	
red	given	that	it	 looks	red	under	red	lighting	is	 less	than	the	probability	that	the	
wall	is	red	given	only	that	it	looks	red.	In	this	way,	the	evidence	about	the	lighting	
reduces	the	degree	to	which	your	sensory	evidence	supports	this	conclusion.	This	
is	 presumably	 what	 Pollock	 intends	 when	 he	 says	 that	 undercutting	 defeaters	
“attack	 the	 connection”	 between	 the	 evidence	 and	 the	 conclusion,	 rather	 than	
attacking	the	conclusion	itself.	
Now	let’s	revisit	the	hypoxia	example:	how	does	the	evidence	that	you	are	
hypoxic	 defeat	 your	 evidence	 that	 you	 have	 enough	 fuel?	 It’s	 not	 a	 rebutting	
defeater,	of	 course,	but	not	all	defeaters	 are	 rebutting	defeaters.	 Is	 it	perhaps	an	
undercutting	 defeater	 that	 reduces	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 your	 evidence	 supports	
this	 conclusion?	 I’ll	 argue	 that	 it	 isn’t,	 since	 the	 evidence	 that	 you’re	 hypoxic	
makes	no	difference	to	your	overall	degree	of	evidential	support	for	the	conclusion	
that	you	have	enough	fuel.	There	is	no	sense	in	which	your	higher-order	evidence	
defeats	the	evidential	support	provided	by	your	first-order	evidence.	
The	key	point	is	that	the	conclusion	that	you	have	enough	fuel	is	entailed	by	
known	premises	about	the	distance	of	the	 journey	and	the	amount	of	 fuel	 in	the	
tank.	Entailment	is	monotonic:	we	cannot	undermine	an	entailment	from	premises	
to	 conclusion	 by	 adding	 new	 premises.	 In	 particular,	 we	 cannot	 undermine	 the	
entailment	 from	premises	 to	conclusion	by	adding	the	premise	that	you	botched	
the	deduction	as	 a	 result	of	hypoxia.	The	expanded	 set	of	premises	 continues	 to	
entail	the	conclusion	that	you	have	enough	fuel.	
Moreover,	 entailment	 is	 the	 strongest	 kind	 of	 evidential	 support	 relation.	
Arguments	 come	 in	 varying	 degrees	 of	 strength:	 the	 stronger	 an	 argument,	 the	
higher	the	probability	that	its	conclusion	is	true	given	that	its	premises	are	true.	A	
deductively	valid	argument	is	the	strongest	kind	of	argument,	since	it	is	not	merely	
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improbable	but	impossible	that	the	conclusion	is	false	when	the	premises	are	true.	
This	 is	 the	 limiting	 case	 in	 which	 the	 probability	 of	 the	 conclusion	 given	 the	
premises	 is	 1.	 Since	 the	 premises	 of	 a	 deductively	 valid	 argument	 entail	 its	
conclusion,	the	probability	of	the	conclusion	can	be	no	less	than	the	probability	of	
the	conjunction	of	 the	premises.	Thus,	deductively	valid	arguments	preserve	not	
only	truth	from	premises	to	conclusion,	but	also	degrees	of	evidential	support.3	
Before	 you	 acquire	 the	 evidence	 of	 hypoxia,	 your	 premises	 about	 the	
distance	 of	 the	 journey	 and	 the	 amount	 of	 fuel	 remaining	 are	 highly	 probable	
given	your	evidence.	Indeed,	the	probability	of	the	conjunction	of	these	premises	
is	 high	 enough	 that	 you	 can	 know	 the	 conclusion	 by	 deduction	 from	 these	
premises.	 Since	 your	 premises	 entail	 the	 conclusion,	 the	 probability	 of	 the	
conclusion	is	no	less	than	the	probability	of	the	conjunction	of	the	premises.	
What	 changes	when	 you	 acquire	 the	 new	 evidence	 that	 you	 are	 hypoxic?	
Now	you	have	evidence	that	you	are	cognitively	impaired	in	ways	that	dispose	you	
to	 botch	 the	 reasoning	 from	 your	 premises	 to	 your	 conclusion.	 As	 we’ve	 seen,	
however,	 this	 doesn’t	 undermine	 the	 entailment	 from	 premises	 to	 conclusion.	
Moreover,	this	doesn’t	affect	the	evidential	probability	of	the	premises	themselves.	
The	 strength	 of	 your	 evidence	 for	 these	 premises	 remains	 unchanged.	 After	 all,	
hypoxia	doesn’t	cause	you	to	hallucinate	the	readings	on	your	control	panel	or	to	
invent	new	estimates	of	the	distance	to	your	destination.	Rather,	the	point	of	the	
example	is	that	it	impairs	your	capacity	to	acquire	knowledge	by	deduction.	
Since	 the	evidence	of	hypoxia	doesn’t	 change	 the	evidential	probability	of	
the	premises,	it	doesn't	change	the	evidential	probability	of	the	conclusion	either.	
Hence,	acquiring	this	new	evidence	does	nothing	to	reduce	the	probability	of	your	
conclusion.	I	conclude	that	the	evidence	of	hypoxia	is	no	evidential	defeater	at	all,	
since	it	doesn’t	reduce	the	overall	degree	of	evidential	support	for	your	conclusion.	
All	 evidential	 defeaters,	 whether	 or	 not	 they	 are	 evidence	 against	 a	 conclusion,	
reduce	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 your	 total	 evidence	 supports	 a	 conclusion.	We	 can	
articulate	this	as	a	probabilistic	constraint	on	evidential	defeat:	
	
A	 Probabilistic	 Constraint	 on	 Evidential	 Defeat:	 If	d	 defeats	 the	 evidential	
support	 that	e	provides	 for	h,	 then	 the	probability	 that	h	 given	e	 and	d	 is	
less	than	the	probability	that	h	given	e	alone.4	
	
The	 higher-order	 evidence	 that	 you	 are	 hypoxic	 doesn’t	 satisfy	 this	 probabilistic	
constraint,	 since	 the	 evidential	 probability	 that	 you	 have	 enough	 fuel	 remains	
unchanged	when	you	receive	this	new	evidence.	
Some	may	be	tempted	to	block	this	objection	by	rejecting	the	probabilistic	
conception	of	evidential	support	on	which	it	depends.	In	response,	however,	this																																																									
3	See	Skyrms	(1966:	Ch.	2)	for	a	compelling	articulation	of	this	point.	In	the	text,	I	
assume	regularity	–	that	is,	impossible	scenarios	have	zero	probability.	
4	Compare	Kotzen’s	thesis	that	defeaters	are	credence	lowering:	“D	is	a	defeater	for	
the	evidence	that	E	provides	for	H	just	in	case	p	(H	|	E	∧	D)	<	p	(H	|	E)”	(2019:	15).	
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comes	at	too	high	a	cost.	As	we’ve	seen,	the	probabilistic	framework	is	designed	to	
capture	the	important	insight	that	arguments	come	in	varying	degrees	of	strength.	
Deductively	valid	arguments	provide	the	strongest	possible	degree	of	support	for	a	
conclusion,	since	the	premises	entail	the	conclusion,	rather	than	merely	raising	the	
probability	of	the	conclusion.	My	objection	exploits	this	intuitive	point	about	the	
strength	 of	 deductive	 arguments,	 which	 is	 captured	 most	 naturally	 in	 a	
probabilistic	framework.	
To	 be	 clear,	 I	 am	 not	 questioning	 the	 intuitive	 datum	 that	 higher-order	
evidence	 of	 hypoxia	 destroys	 your	 knowledge	 that	 you	 have	 enough	 fuel.	
Moreover,	I	have	no	complaint	about	the	practice	of	articulating	this	datum	using	
the	 language	of	 ‘defeat’	 so	 long	as	we	are	careful	 to	 recognize	 that	 this	 is	not	an	
explanation	of	the	datum	but	merely	a	restatement	of	the	datum	to	be	explained.	
The	challenge	that	remains	 is	 to	explain	why	 this	higher-order	evidence	destroys	
your	knowledge.	 In	 this	section,	 I’ve	argued	that	 the	evidence	of	hypoxia	doesn’t	
undermine	your	knowledge	by	reducing	your	overall	degree	of	evidential	support	
for	the	conclusion	that	you	have	enough	fuel.	Some	other	explanation	is	needed.	
	
2. Epistemic	Conflicts	
David	 Christensen	 (2007,	 2010a)	 argues	 that	 higher-order	 evidence	 destroys	
knowledge	 by	 creating	 epistemic	 conflicts.	 Misleading	 higher-order	 evidence	 is	
“rationally	 toxic”	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 forces	 you	 to	 violate	 one	 of	 the	 following	
epistemic	ideals:	
	
(1) Respecting	your	first-order	evidence.	
(2) Respecting	your	higher-order	evidence.	
(3) Meta-coherence,	 i.e.	 coherently	 integrating	 your	 first-order	 beliefs	 with	
your	higher-order	beliefs.	
	
In	 the	 hypoxia	 case,	 for	 example,	 you	 cannot	 respect	 all	 your	 evidence	 while	
coherently	 integrating	 your	 first-order	 and	 higher-order	 beliefs.	 Your	 first-order	
evidence	 supports	 the	belief	 that	 you	have	 enough	 fuel,	while	 your	higher-order	
evidence	 supports	 the	 higher-order	 belief	 that	 this	 first-order	 belief	 is	 probably	
based	 on	 bad	 reasoning.	 And	 yet	 this	 combination	 of	 beliefs	 seems	 dubiously	
coherent.	 As	 Christensen	 writes,	 “the	 rationality	 of	 first-order	 beliefs	 cannot	 in	
general	be	divorced	 from	the	rationality	of	certain	second-order	beliefs	 that	bear	
on	the	epistemic	status	of	those	first-order	beliefs”	(2007:	18).	
Christensen	argues	that	the	rationally	optimal	way	of	resolving	this	conflict	
is	to	violate	the	epistemic	ideal	of	respecting	your	evidence.	Rather	than	believing	
what	 your	 evidence	 supports	 –	 namely,	 that	 you	have	 enough	 fuel	 –	 you	 should	
instead	 remain	agnostic.	Hence,	epistemic	 rationality	 requires	 that	you	 “bracket”	
your	 first-order	 evidence	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 you	 refrain	 from	 believing	 what	 it	
supports.	On	 this	 view,	 your	 knowledge	 that	 you	 have	 enough	 fuel	 is	 destroyed	
when	 you	 acquire	 the	 evidence	 that	 you	 are	 hypoxic	 because	 it	 is	 no	 longer	
epistemically	rational	to	believe	what	your	evidence	supports.	
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There	 is	 something	 puzzling	 about	 this	 proposal.	 How	 can	 epistemic	
rationality	 require	 you	 to	 refrain	 from	 believing	 what	 your	 evidence	 supports?	
According	 to	 evidentialism	 in	 epistemology,	 epistemic	 rationality	 is	 simply	 a	
matter	 of	 proportioning	 your	 beliefs	 to	 your	 evidence.5	On	 this	 view,	 epistemic	
rationality	never	 requires	or	even	permits	you	 to	 “bracket”	any	of	your	evidence.	
On	the	contrary,	it	imposes	a	requirement	of	total	evidence,	which	says	you	should	
always	take	all	of	your	evidence	into	account	in	deciding	what	to	believe.	
Christensen’s	proposal	can	be	understood	as	a	form	of	bifurcationism	about	
epistemic	 rationality.6	On	 this	 view,	 the	 structural	 requirements	 of	 coherence,	
including	 meta-coherence,	 are	 distinct	 from	 and	 irreducible	 to	 the	 structural	
requirement	of	respecting	your	evidence.	Moreover,	these	requirements	can	come	
into	conflict	when	you	have	misleading	higher-order	evidence	about	your	response	
to	 your	 first-order	 evidence,	 since	 your	 total	 evidence	 supports	meta-incoherent	
beliefs.	Christensen’s	proposal	is	that	the	rationally	optimal	way	of	resolving	these	
conflicting	 requirements	 is	 to	 maintain	 meta-coherence	 in	 response	 to	 your	
higher-order	evidence	by	disrespecting	your	first-order	evidence.	
I	 argue	elsewhere	 that	we	 should	prefer	 a	unified	 conception	of	 epistemic	
rationality,	according	to	which	the	structural	requirements	of	coherence	are	built	
into	 the	 structure	of	 the	evidential	 support	 relation	 (Smithies,	 forthcoming).	For	
example,	 we	 can	 build	 in	 requirements	 of	 logical	 or	 probabilistic	 coherence	 by	
endorsing	a	probabilistic	conception	of	the	evidential	support	relation,	according	
to	which	 degrees	 of	 evidential	 support	 are	 evidential	 probabilities.	 Similarly,	 we	
can	build	in	a	meta-coherence	requirement	by	endorsing	structural	constraints	on	
higher-order	probabilities,	such	as	the	following:	
	
Probabilistic	Accessibilism:	Necessarily,	if	the	evidential	probability	that	p	is	
n,	then	it	is	evidentially	certain	that	the	evidential	probability	that	p	is	n.7	
	
On	 this	unified	 conception	of	 epistemic	 rationality,	 there	 is	no	distinction	 to	be	
drawn	 between	 the	 substantive	 requirement	 to	 respect	 your	 evidence	 and	 the	
structural	requirement	to	be	coherent.	There	is	just	one	evidentialist	requirement	
that	 incorporates	 both	 substantive	 and	 structural	 dimensions	 –	 that	 is,	 to																																																									
5	See	Feldman	and	Conee	(1985)	for	a	classic	defense	of	evidentialism.	
6	Compare	Worsnip	 (2018)	 for	 a	 similar	 view.	 See	 Smithies	 (forthcoming)	 for	 a	
detailed	critical	discussion	of	 several	different	 forms	of	bifurcationism,	 including	
those	defended	by	Christensen	and	Worsnip.	
7	Christensen	 (2010b)	and	Elga	 (2013)	 reject	probabilistic	accessibilism	 in	 favor	of	
rational	 reflection	principles,	 but	 these	higher-order	 constraints	 are	 too	weak	 to	
prohibit	instances	of	epistemic	akrasia	in	which	you	are	certain	that	your	credence	
is	irrational,	although	you	are	agnostic	about	whether	it	is	too	high	or	too	low.	In	
Smithies	 (2019:	Ch.	 10),	 I	 defend	probabilistic	 accessibilism	against	 the	objection	
that	it	is	“immodest”	by	appealing	to	the	distinction	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	
standards	of	epistemic	rationality	drawn	in	§5	below.	
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proportion	your	beliefs	to	your	evidence	in	the	sense	that	your	beliefs	cohere	with	
substantive	facts	about	your	evidence	in	accordance	with	structural	facts	about	the	
evidential	support	relation.	These	structural	constraints	on	the	evidential	support	
relation	guarantee	that	your	evidence	never	supports	an	incoherent	set	of	beliefs.	
Occam’s	 razor	 prohibits	multiplying	 requirements	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	
beyond	 necessity.	Why	 then	might	 someone	 endorse	 bifurcationism?	 The	 usual	
answer	 is	 that	 bifurcationism	 is	 supported	 by	 reflection	 on	 examples.	 In	 the	
hypoxia	case,	for	example,	your	evidence	seems	to	support	the	following	beliefs:	
	
(1) I	have	enough	fuel.	
(2) But	my	belief	that	I	have	enough	fuel	 is	probably	based	on	bad	reasoning,	
since	I	am	cognitively	impaired	as	a	result	of	hypoxia.	
(3) Therefore,	my	belief	 that	 I	have	enough	fuel	 is	probably	not	supported	by	
good	evidence.	
	
And	 yet	 this	 combination	 of	 beliefs	 violates	 the	 meta-coherence	 requirement,	
since	 it	 is	 always	 irrational	 to	hold	a	belief	while	 also	believing	 that	 it	 is	neither	
based	on	nor	supported	by	good	evidence.	Hence,	the	substantive	requirement	to	
respect	 your	 evidence	 seems	 to	 conflict	 in	 this	 case	 with	 the	 structural	
requirement	of	meta-coherence.	
As	we’ve	 seen,	however,	we	can	build	 the	 requirement	of	meta-coherence	
into	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 evidential	 support	 relation.	 Given	 probabilistic	
accessibilism,	 for	 example,	 you	 cannot	 have	 misleading	 higher-order	 evidence	
about	 what	 your	 evidence	 supports,	 since	 the	 facts	 about	 what	 your	 evidence	
supports	 are	 always	made	certain	by	your	evidence.	On	 this	 view,	 your	evidence	
never	 supports	 a	meta-incoherent	 combination	of	beliefs	 of	 the	 form,	 ‘p	 and	my	
evidence	probably	doesn’t	support	p’.	Hence,	respecting	your	evidence	guarantees	
that	you	are	also	meta-coherent.	
Now,	of	course,	you	can	have	misleading	higher-order	evidence	about	your	
response	 to	your	evidence,	although	you	can	never	have	misleading	higher-order	
evidence	 about	 what	 your	 evidence	 supports.	 This	 is	 because	 facts	 about	 your	
response	to	your	evidence,	unlike	facts	about	what	your	evidence	supports,	are	not	
made	certain	by	your	evidence.	As	a	general	rule,	the	argument	from	(2)	to	(3)	is	
inductively	strong,	since	beliefs	based	on	bad	reasoning	are	not	usually	supported	
by	 good	 evidence.	 In	 your	 own	 case,	 however,	 the	 inference	 from	 (2)	 to	 (3)	 is	
blocked	 when	 your	 higher-order	 evidence	 is	 misleading.	 In	 such	 cases,	 your	
evidence	supports	believing	(1)	and	(2)	but	not	(3).	
Moreover,	 believing	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 is	 not	 incoherent	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	
believing	 (1)	 and	 (3).	 It’s	 always	 irrational	 to	 believe	 that	 p	 while	 believing	 that	
your	evidence	doesn’t	 support	p.	This	combination	of	beliefs	 is	 self-defeating:	by	
your	 own	 lights,	 you	 should	 abandon	 your	 belief	 that	 p,	 since	 you	 think	 it	 is	
unsupported	by	your	evidence.	In	contrast,	it’s	not	always	irrational	to	believe	that	
p	 while	 believing	 that	 your	 belief	 is	 not	 properly	 based	 on	 supporting	 evidence.	
Indeed,	 this	can	be	a	perfectly	rational	response	to	misleading	evidence	that	you	
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believe	the	right	thing	for	the	wrong	reasons.	It	is	not	self-defeating	in	such	cases	
to	 conclude	 that	 your	 belief	 is	 supported	 by	 good	 evidence,	 although	 it	 is	 not	
properly	based	on	good	evidence.	
To	 illustrate	 the	 point,	 consider	 a	 practical	 analogy.	 Suppose	 a	 wealthy	
philanthropist	receives	public	acclaim	for	donating	large	sums	of	money	to	charity.	
He	knows	he	is	doing	the	right	thing,	but	he	suspects	he	is	doing	it	for	the	wrong	
reasons	because	he	has	misleading	evidence	that	he	is	selfishly	motivated.	So	long	
as	 this	 evidence	 is	 misleading,	 his	 action	 may	 be	 rationally	 responsive	 to	 good	
moral	reasons.	The	same	applies	to	someone	who	knows	that	he	believes	what	his	
evidence	 supports,	 although	he	 suspects	 his	 belief	 is	 held	 for	 the	wrong	 reasons	
because	he	has	misleading	evidence	that	he	is	motivated	by	wishful	thinking.	Once	
again,	 his	 belief	 may	 be	 rationally	 responsive	 to	 good	 evidence	 so	 long	 as	 this	
higher-order	evidence	is	misleading.	In	such	cases,	there	is	nothing	self-defeating	
about	doubting	the	reasoning	on	which	your	beliefs	and	actions	are	based.	
Admittedly,	 there	 is	 something	unusual	 about	 an	evidential	 situation	 that	
supports	the	following	line	of	argument:	
	
(4) It’s	 certain	 that	my	 evidence	 supports	 the	 conclusion	 that	 I	 have	 enough	
fuel.	
(5) But	my	belief	that	I	have	enough	fuel	is	probably	based	on	bad	reasoning.	
(6) So	I	probably	got	lucky,	since	bad	reasoning	led	me	to	form	a	belief	that	is	
supported	by	the	evidence.	
	
In	the	absence	of	strong	evidence,	 it’s	 irrational	 to	believe	 in	 lucky	coincidences.	
After	all,	the	prior	probability	of	such	a	coincidence	is	very	low.	In	the	presence	of	
strong	evidence,	however,	the	posterior	probability	of	a	coincidence	may	be	high.	
There	is	nothing	in	principle	to	rule	out	the	possibility	that	your	evidence	supports	
the	 conclusion	 that	 a	 lucky	 coincidence	 has	 occurred.	 Otherwise,	 no	 one	 could	
find	out	when	they	win	the	lottery.	The	hypoxia	example	is	another	case	in	point,	
since	your	evidence	supports	the	conclusion	that	you	got	lucky.	
Does	 this	 license	 dogmatism	 in	 response	 to	 higher-order	 evidence?	
Consider	our	 steadfast	pilot	who	maintains	his	belief	 that	he	has	 enough	 fuel	 in	
the	 face	of	 the	higher-order	evidence	 that	he	 is	hypoxic.	Suppose	 that	 instead	of	
simply	 ignoring	 this	 higher-order	 evidence,	 he	 concludes	 that	 he	must	 have	 got	
lucky,	 since	his	belief	 is	 supported	by	 evidence	 although	 it	 is	probably	based	on	
bad	 reasoning.	 Intuitively,	 this	 compounds	 his	 irrationality.	 It	 was	 already	
irrational	 for	him	to	retain	 the	 first-order	belief	 that	he	has	enough	 fuel	and	the	
problem	is	exacerbated	when	he	doubles	down	by	retaining	the	higher-order	belief	
that	 his	 evidence	 supports	 this	 conclusion.	 Our	 steadfast	 pilot	 maintains	 meta-
coherence	at	the	cost	of	both	first-order	and	higher-order	dogmatism.	
I	agree	the	steadfast	pilot	is	irrational,	but	this	just	shows	that	our	original	
problem	arises	at	multiple	 levels.	At	 level	one,	the	problem	is	to	explain	why	the	
pilot	cannot	rationally	believe	that	he	has	enough	fuel	when	his	evidence	supports	
this	conclusion.	At	 the	 level	 two,	 the	problem	 is	 to	explain	why	 the	pilot	cannot	
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rationally	 believe	 that	 his	 evidence	 supports	 this	 conclusion	 when	 his	 evidence	
also	supports	this	higher-order	conclusion.	And	so	on	as	we	ascend	the	hierarchy.	
I’ll	propose	my	own	solution	to	this	problem	in	due	course.	My	goal	in	this	section	
is	 merely	 to	 argue	 that	 we	 cannot	 solve	 it	 by	 arguing	 that	 the	 pilot’s	 evidence	
supports	 incoherent	 beliefs.	 There	 are	 general	 theoretical	 reasons	 to	 doubt	 that	
your	 evidence	 can	 ever	 support	 incoherent	 beliefs	 and	 there	 are	 more	 specific	
reasons	to	doubt	that	the	pilot’s	evidence	supports	incoherent	beliefs.	We	need	to	
look	elsewhere	to	explain	why	it	is	irrational	for	the	steadfast	pilot	to	retain	beliefs	
that	are	nevertheless	supported	by	his	evidence.	
	
3. Unreasonable	Knowledge	
Maria	Lasonen-Aarnio	(2010,	2020)	argues	that	the	steadfast	pilot	has	unreasonable	
knowledge.8	On	 this	view,	 the	pilot	can	 retain	his	knowledge	 that	he	has	enough	
fuel	even	 in	the	 face	of	misleading	higher-order	evidence	that	he	 is	hypoxic.	The	
problem	 is	 that	 his	 belief	 is	 unreasonable	 because	 it	 manifests	 a	 more	 general	
disposition	 to	 be	 unresponsive	 to	 evidence	 in	 other	 cases.	 And	 yet	 this	 needn’t	
undermine	his	knowledge	so	long	as	he	responds	appropriately	to	all	the	evidence	
that	he	actually	has.	Thus,	reasonable	belief	is	not	necessary	for	knowledge.	
What	is	it	for	a	belief	to	be	reasonable?	Lasonen-Aarnio	writes:	
	
Reasonableness	 is	 at	 least	 largely	 a	 matter	 of	 managing	 one’s	 beliefs	
through	 the	 adoption	 of	 policies	 that	 are	 generally	 knowledge	 conducive,	
thereby	 manifesting	 dispositions	 to	 know	 and	 avoid	 false	 belief	 across	 a	
wide	range	of	normal	cases.	(2010:	2)	
	
The	 steadfast	 pilot	 is	 unreasonable	 because	 he	 fails	 to	manifest	 dispositions	 are	
generally	conducive	 to	knowledge	–	 that	 is,	dispositions	 to	know	and	avoid	 false	
belief	across	a	wide	range	of	normal	cases.	 In	particular,	he	 is	disposed	to	 ignore	
higher-order	evidence	that	his	beliefs	are	based	on	bad	reasoning	not	only	in	the	
“good	case”	in	which	his	higher-order	evidence	is	misleading	but	also	in	the	“bad	
case”	in	which	it	is	accurate.	Since	the	actual	case	is	a	good	case,	his	belief	is	not	
only	true,	but	also	supported	by	his	evidence.	Nevertheless,	it	is	held	dogmatically	
in	 a	way	 that	disposes	him	 to	 retain	beliefs	 in	bad	 cases	 that	 are	both	 false	 and	
unsupported	by	evidence.	
In	short,	the	steadfast	pilot	is	unreasonable	because	he	manifests	a	general	
disposition	that	leads	him	astray	in	other	cases.	And	yet	this	leaves	his	knowledge	
intact	so	long	as	the	disposition	doesn’t	lead	him	astray	in	this	case.	He	retains	his	
knowledge	because	his	true	belief	remains	as	safe	from	error,	and	as	responsive	to	
his	first-order	evidence,	as	it	was	before	he	acquired	the	higher-order	evidence	of	
hypoxia.	Since	he	had	knowledge	beforehand,	he	retains	his	knowledge	in	the	face	
of	his	new	higher-order	evidence,	despite	the	fact	that	his	belief	is	unreasonable.																																																									
8	Lasonen-Aarnio	(2010)	focuses	on	standard	examples	of	undercutting	defeat,	but	
she	extends	her	proposal	to	higher-order	evidence	in	Lasonen-Aarnio	(2020).	
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It’s	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 same	 proposal	 applies	 at	 multiple	 levels.	
Presumably,	the	steadfast	pilot	can	retain	not	only	his	first-order	knowledge	that	
he	has	enough	fuel,	but	also	his	higher-order	knowledge	that	his	evidence	supports	
this	 conclusion.	Moreover,	 given	 the	misleading	 evidence	 that	 he	 is	 hypoxic,	 he	
can	 rationally	 conclude	 from	 these	 known	 premises	 that	 he	 probably	 got	 lucky,	
since	 his	 cognitive	 impairment	 didn’t	 lead	 him	 astray	 on	 this	 occasion.	 The	
problem	with	his	first-order	and	higher-order	beliefs	is	that	they	are	unreasonable	
because	they	manifest	more	general	dispositions	to	go	awry	in	bad	cases	in	which	
his	 higher-order	 evidence	 is	 accurate.	 But	 this	 has	 no	 tendency	 to	 undermine	
either	the	pilot’s	first-order	knowledge	or	his	higher-order	knowledge.	
I’ll	now	raise	three	objections	to	this	proposal.	First,	it	fails	to	vindicate	all	
our	intuitions	about	the	hypoxia	case.	It	vindicates	the	intuition	that	the	steadfast	
pilot	is	unreasonable,	but	not	the	intuition	that	he	loses	knowledge.	Is	it	plausible	
that	the	steadfast	pilot	retains	his	first-order	knowledge	that	he	has	enough	fuel	as	
well	as	his	higher-order	knowledge	that	his	evidence	supports	this	conclusion?	Is	it	
plausible	 that	 he	 can	use	 this	 knowledge,	 together	with	his	misleading	 evidence	
that	he	is	hypoxic,	to	infer	that	he	probably	got	lucky	on	this	occasion?	To	many,	
myself	included,	these	verdicts	are	strongly	counterintuitive.	
Lasonen-Aarnio	proposes	to	explain	away	conflicting	intuitions	by	appeal	to	
the	error	 theory	 that	we	 tend	 to	conflate	 reasonableness	and	knowledge.	 I	 agree	
that	 our	 intuitions	 about	 this	 case,	 and	many	 others,	 are	 guided	 by	 the	 implicit	
assumption	that	only	reasonable	beliefs	can	be	knowledge.	This	explains	why	we	
find	it	so	natural	to	make	the	inference	from	the	premise	that	someone’s	belief	is	
unreasonable	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 they	 lack	 knowledge.	 Given	 the	 intuitive	
plausibility	of	this	assumption,	however,	why	suppose	it	is	mistaken?	To	my	mind,	
the	error	theory	should	be	regarded	as	a	last	resort:	all	else	being	equal,	we	should	
prefer	an	epistemological	theory	that	vindicates	our	intuitive	reactions.	
Second,	 there	 are	 general	 theoretical	 grounds	 for	 doubting	 that	 you	 can	
acquire	knowledge	by	manifesting	unreasonable	dispositions.	To	know	that	p,	it’s	
not	enough	that	you	truly	believe	that	p;	your	belief	must	be	reliable	in	the	sense	
that	 it	 manifests	 a	 more	 general	 disposition	 to	 have	 true	 beliefs.	 Similarly,	 to	
rationally	or	justifiably	believe	that	p,	it’s	not	enough	that	your	belief	is	supported	
by	good	evidence;	it	must	be	properly	based	on	good	evidence	in	the	sense	that	it	
manifests	 a	more	 general	 disposition	 to	have	beliefs	 that	 are	 supported	by	 good	
evidence.	 Hence,	 knowledge	 requires	 manifesting	 good	 dispositions	 that	 are	
reliably	 responsive	 to	 evidence	 and	 truth.	 When	 your	 beliefs	 manifest	
unreasonable	 dispositions,	 however,	 they	 are	 not	 reliable	 enough	 to	 constitute	
knowledge.	 Presumably,	 this	 is	 why	 it	 remains	 so	 intuitively	 plausible	 that	 only	
reasonable	 beliefs	 can	 be	 knowledge.	 This	 is	 not	 just	 a	 brute	 intuition	 with	 no	
theoretical	 support.	 It	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 theoretical	 consideration	 that	
knowledge	must	be	reliably	responsive	to	evidence	and	truth.	
Lasonen-Aarnio	 sympathetically	discusses	 the	 simple	 externalist	 view	 that	
knowledge	is	true	belief	that	is	safe	 from	error	 in	the	sense	that	it	couldn't	easily	
have	been	false.	But	the	case	of	mathematical	knowledge	suggests	that	this	view	is	
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too	simple:	I	cannot	know	that	Fermat’s	Last	Theorem	is	true	by	means	of	wishful	
thinking,	 although	 there	 is	no	danger	 that	my	belief	 is	 false,	 since	 its	 content	 is	
necessarily	true.	Arguably,	this	is	because	my	safe	belief	is	based	on	manifesting	an	
unsafe	 disposition:	 one	 that	 could	 easily	 yield	 false	 beliefs	 in	 other	 cases.	 This	
supports	 the	claim	that	a	belief	 is	knowledge	only	 if	 it	 is	 reasonable	 in	the	sense	
that	it	manifests	a	more	generally	reliable	disposition.9	
Third,	 there	 are	 theoretical	 costs	 involved	 in	 rejecting	 the	 principle	 that	
only	reasonable	beliefs	can	be	knowledge.	Knowledge	is	valuable.	If	we	allow	that	
knowledge	can	be	unreasonable,	however,	then	we	risk	devaluing	knowledge.	So,	
for	example,	knowledge	is	often	thought	to	set	a	normative	standard	of	correctness	
for	belief	and	action:	if	you	know	that	p,	then	you	are	right	to	believe	that	p,	and	to	
act	on	the	premise	that	p,	and	so	you	cannot	legitimately	be	blamed	for	doing	so.	
And	yet	 the	steadfast	pilot	 is	blameworthy	 for	acting	on	the	premise	 that	he	has	
enough	 fuel:	 his	 mother	 can	 be	 justly	 angry	 that	 he	 acted	 so	 recklessly.	 As	
Lasonen-Aarnio	acknowledges,	“Subjects	who	retain	knowledge	in	defeat	cases	are	
genuinely	criticisable”	(2010:	15).	The	problem	is	that	we	cannot	maintain	that	the	
steadfast	 pilot	 retains	 his	 knowledge,	 while	 also	 acknowledging	 his	 culpability,	
unless	we	 abandon	 these	 plausible	 connections	 between	 knowledge,	 permission,	
and	 blameworthiness.	 But	 this	 devalues	 knowledge	 in	 ways	 that	 should	 be	
unattractive	to	anyone,	especially	to	proponents	of	knowledge-first	epistemology.	
In	 conclusion,	 we	 need	 to	 explain	 not	 only	 how	 evidence	 of	 hypoxia	 can	
make	 your	 beliefs	 unreasonable,	 but	 also	 how	 it	 can	 destroy	 your	 knowledge.	
Although	 Lasonen-Aarnio’s	 proposal	 fails	 to	 explain	 this	 datum,	 it	 contains	 an	
important	grain	of	truth,	which	will	figure	prominently	in	the	discussion	to	follow.	
To	explain	how	higher-order	evidence	destroys	your	knowledge,	we	need	to	invoke	
facts	about	the	reliability	of	your	doxastic	dispositions.	
	
4. Improper	Basing	
My	own	explanation	of	how	higher-order	evidence	destroys	first-order	knowledge	
appeals	to	improper	basing.10	On	this	view,	the	higher-order	evidence	that	you	are	
hypoxic	 doesn’t	 defeat	 your	 first-order	 evidence	 that	 you	 have	 enough	 fuel,	 but	
merely	 prevents	 you	 from	 properly	 basing	 your	 beliefs	 on	 this	 evidence.	 This	
explains	 why	 you	 lose	 your	 knowledge	 that	 you	 have	 enough	 fuel	 when	 you	
acquire	the	higher-order	evidence	that	you	are	hypoxic.	Only	justified	beliefs	can	
be	knowledge	and	a	belief	is	justified	only	if	it	is	properly	based	on	good	evidence.																																																									
9	See	Sosa	(2003)	for	a	defense	of	this	claim.	In	Smithies	(2019:	Ch.	11),	I	argue	for	
similar	conclusions	about	justification	based	on	the	problem	of	the	speckled	hen:	
justified	belief	requires	exercising	a	disposition	that	is	reliably	responsive	to	what	
your	evidence	supports.	
10	Compare	Smithies	(2015;	2019:	Ch.	10).	Van	Wietmarschen	(2013)	adopts	a	similar	
line	on	peer	disagreement,	although	his	explanation	of	how	higher-order	evidence	
undermines	proper	basing	diverges	from	mine.	
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We	 can	 articulate	 the	 point	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 familiar	 distinction	 between	
propositional	 and	 doxastic	 senses	 of	 epistemic	 justification,	 rationality,	 or	
warrant.11	A	 belief	 is	 propositionally	 justified	 when	 its	 propositional	 content	 is	
supported	 by	 good	 evidence,	 whereas	 a	 belief	 is	 doxastically	 justified	 when	 the	
belief	is	held	in	a	way	that	is	properly	based	on	good	evidence.	Thus,	proper	basing	
is	 the	 relation	between	a	belief	 and	a	body	of	 supporting	evidence	 that	 converts	
propositional	 justification	 into	 doxastic	 justification.	 The	 higher-order	 evidence	
that	you	are	hypoxic	doesn’t	undermine	your	propositional	justification	to	believe	
that	you	have	enough	fuel	by	defeating	your	evidence	for	this	conclusion.	Rather,	
it	undermines	your	doxastic	 justification	by	preventing	you	from	properly	basing	
your	 belief	 on	 this	 evidence.	 In	 a	 slogan,	 higher-order	 evidence	 is	 a	 doxastic	
defeater,	rather	than	a	propositional	defeater.	
What	does	 it	 take	 for	a	belief	 to	be	properly	based	on	good	evidence?	 It’s	
not	enough	that	my	belief	is	based	on	good	evidence	that	happens	to	support	my	
beliefs.	My	 belief	must	 also	manifest	 a	more	 general	 disposition	 that	 is	 reliably	
sensitive	to	differences	in	what	my	evidence	supports.	If	I’m	disposed	to	retain	my	
belief	even	if	my	evidence	changes	in	ways	that	no	longer	support	the	belief,	then	
it	 is	 not	 properly	 based	 on	 the	 evidence.	 My	 belief	 is	 properly	 based	 on	 the	
evidence	 only	 if	 it	 manifests	 a	 more	 general	 disposition	 to	 believe	 what	 the	
evidence	supports.12	
Dogmatic	 beliefs	 violate	 this	 condition.	 Consider	my	 belief	 that	 drinking	
red	wine	is	good	for	my	health.	Let’s	assume	that	while	the	evidence	for	this	claim	
is	somewhat	mixed,	the	evidence	in	its	favor	outweighs	the	evidence	against,	and	
that	the	supporting	evidence	is	strong	enough	to	justify	belief.	Although	I’m	aware	
of	all	this	evidence,	the	problem	is	that	I	hold	my	belief	dogmatically	in	a	way	that	
makes	me	relatively	insensitive	to	changes	in	what	my	evidence	supports.	I	am	not	
disposed	to	respond	to	changes	in	what	my	evidence	supports	with	corresponding	
changes	in	what	I	believe.	I	will	remain	unmoved,	for	example,	if	I	learn	about	new	
studies	 casting	 doubt	 on	 the	 health	 benefits	 of	 drinking	 red	 wine.	 Intuitively,	 I	
don’t	know	that	drinking	wine	is	good	for	me,	even	if	my	belief	is	true	and	based	
on	 good	 evidence.	 The	 problem	 is	 that	 my	 belief	 is	 not	 properly	 based	 on	 my	
evidence,	since	it	manifests	a	disposition	that	is	insufficiently	sensitive	to	changes	
in	what	my	evidence	supports.	
I	suggest	that	the	same	is	true	of	the	steadfast	pilot.	He	doesn’t	know	that	
he	 has	 enough	 fuel,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 his	 belief	 is	 true	 and	 based	 on	 good																																																									
11 	This	 distinction	 is	 usually	 traced	 back	 to	 Firth	 (1978),	 although	 it	 is	 now	
ubiquitous	in	the	literature	on	epistemic	justification.	
12	In	Smithies	(2019:	Ch.	11),	I	use	the	problem	of	the	speckled	hen	to	motivate	this	
constraint	 on	 proper	 basing.	 More	 specifically,	 I	 argue	 that	 a	 belief	 is	 properly	
based	 on	 supporting	 evidence	 only	 if	 it	manifests	 a	more	 general	 disposition	 to	
form	 beliefs	 that	 are	 safe	 from	 the	 absence	 of	 evidential	 support.	On	 this	 view,	
doxastic	justification	requires	safety	from	the	absence	of	propositional	justification	
just	as	knowledge	requires	safety	from	error.	I	don’t	rely	on	this	proposal	here.	
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evidence,	because	it	is	not	properly	based	on	his	evidence.	The	intuitive	problem	is	
that	his	belief	 is	held	dogmatically,	which	means	it	 is	not	sufficiently	sensitive	to	
changes	 in	what	his	evidence	supports.	We	can	see	 this	by	comparing	 the	 “good	
case”	in	which	his	higher-order	evidence	is	misleading	with	the	“bad	case”	in	which	
his	higher-order	evidence	is	accurate.	
Let’s	set	aside	modally	remote	cases	in	which	the	steadfast	pilot	is	actually	
suffering	 from	 hypoxia,	 since	 this	 dramatically	 alters	 his	 capacity	 for	 reasoning.	
Instead,	 let’s	consider	more	quotidian	cases	 in	which	his	reasoning	capacities	are	
held	constant.	Since	his	capacities	are	fallible,	there	are	cases	much	closer	to	home	
in	which	he	makes	routine	errors	 in	calculation	through	the	defective	exercise	of	
those	very	capacities.	Let’s	consider	a	bad	case	in	which	he	makes	a	routine	error	
and	his	co-pilot	points	out	the	mistake.	If	he	is	disposed	to	remain	steadfast	in	the	
face	of	evidence	that	he	is	hypoxic,	then	he	will	be	equally	disposed	to	ignore	his	
co-pilot	and	stick	to	his	guns.	Moreover,	both	cases	manifest	the	same	disposition	
to	dogmatically	retain	beliefs	in	the	face	of	higher-order	evidence	that	those	beliefs	
are	based	on	bad	reasoning.	
As	we	saw	in	§3,	Lasonen-Aarnio	makes	similar	points	 in	arguing	that	the	
steadfast	pilot	 is	unreasonable	 in	 retaining	his	belief	 that	he	has	enough	 fuel.	 In	
contrast,	my	 goal	 here	 is	 to	 argue	 that	 his	 belief	 is	 doxastically	 unjustified,	 and	
hence	 not	 a	 case	 of	 knowledge,	 since	 it	 is	 not	 properly	 based	 on	 supporting	
evidence.	In	the	good	case,	his	belief	is	true	and	supported	by	evidence;	but	in	the	
bad	case,	 it	 is	 false	and	unsupported	by	evidence.	So,	even	 in	 the	good	case,	 the	
steadfast	pilot	doesn’t	have	knowledge,	since	his	belief	manifests	a	disposition	that	
is	 not	 sufficiently	 sensitive	 to	 changes	 in	 what	 his	 evidence	 supports.	 After	 all,	
there	 are	 close	 cases	 in	which	exercising	 the	 same	disposition	 leads	him	 to	hold	
false	beliefs	in	the	absence	of	evidential	support.	
We	can	apply	the	same	reasoning	one	level	up	to	explain	why	the	steadfast	
pilot	 cannot	 have	 higher-order	 knowledge	 or	 justified	 belief	 about	 his	 own	
epistemic	situation.	Suppose	he	believes	not	only	that	he	has	enough	fuel	but	also	
that	 his	 evidence	 supports	 this	 conclusion.	 Although	 this	 higher-order	 belief	 is	
true	 and	 supported	 by	 conclusive	 evidence,	 it	 is	 not	 properly	 based	 on	 this	
evidence.	After	all,	the	steadfast	pilot	is	disposed	to	believe	exactly	the	same	thing	
in	 the	 bad	 case	 in	which	his	 higher-order	 belief	 is	 false	 and	unsupported	by	his	
evidence.	So,	even	in	the	good	case,	he	doesn’t	know	that	his	evidence	supports	his	
conclusion,	since	his	belief	manifests	a	disposition	that	is	not	sufficiently	sensitive	
to	changes	in	what	his	evidence	supports.	
I	 am	 not	 claiming	 that	 that	 the	 steadfast	 pilot	 loses	 knowledge	 when	 he	
acquires	the	higher-order	evidence	that	he	is	hypoxic.	Indeed,	there	is	something	
deeply	 puzzling	 about	 this	 suggestion.13 	What	 changes	 when	 he	 acquires	 the	
evidence	 that	 he	 is	 hypoxic?	 There	 is	 no	 relevant	 change	 in	 what	 his	 evidence	
supports,	 since	 it	 continues	 to	 support	 the	 conclusion	 that	 he	 has	 enough	 fuel.	
Moreover,	there	is	no	relevant	change	in	his	responsiveness	to	his	evidence,	since																																																									
13	Lasonen-Aarnio	(2010:	3-8)	raises	a	version	of	this	puzzle.	
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acquiring	the	higher-order	evidence	makes	no	difference	to	the	basis	on	which	his	
belief	 is	 held.	 But	 then	 how	 can	 it	 be	 that	 acquiring	 this	 higher-order	 evidence	
destroys	his	knowledge?	
My	answer	is	that	the	steadfast	pilot	doesn’t	lose	knowledge,	since	he	never	
had	 knowledge	 to	 begin	 with.	 You	 cannot	 acquire	 knowledge	 by	 manifesting	
dogmatic	 dispositions	 that	 are	 insensitive	 to	 changes	 in	 what	 your	 evidence	
supports.	In	contrast,	the	conciliatory	pilot	loses	knowledge	when	he	acquires	the	
misleading	higher-order	 evidence	because	he	 responds	by	 abandoning	his	belief.	
There	can	be	no	knowledge	without	belief.	More	importantly,	however,	knowledge	
sometimes	requires	being	disposed	to	abandon	belief	in	response	to	new	evidence.	
The	 conciliatory	 pilot	 has	 knowledge	 before	 acquiring	 the	 evidence	 that	 he	 is	
hypoxic	 only	 because	 he	 is	 disposed	 to	 respond	 to	 this	 new	 evidence	 by	
abandoning	his	belief.	The	conciliatory	pilot	is	more	reliably	sensitive	to	evidence	
than	the	steadfast	pilot	because	he	is	not	disposed	in	bad	cases	to	ignore	accurate	
higher-order	evidence	that	he	has	made	a	mistake.	
I	don’t	claim	that	it’s	impossible	in	principle	to	retain	knowledge	in	the	face	
of	misleading	higher-order	evidence,	but	merely	that	it’s	impossible	in	practice	for	
creatures	 like	 us.	 I	 see	 no	 reason	 to	 rule	 out	 the	metaphysical	 possibility	 of	 an	
ideally	 rational	 agent	 who	 is	 perfectly	 sensitive	 to	 what	 her	 evidence	 supports.	
Because	she	is	perfectly	sensitive	to	her	evidence,	she	can	remain	steadfast	in	good	
cases	without	 running	 the	 risk	 of	 remaining	 steadfast	 in	 bad	 cases	 in	which	her	
reasoning	dispositions	are	held	constant.14	And	yet	 this	 is	beyond	the	capacity	of	
any	normal	human	agent,	since	we	are	only	imperfectly	sensitive	to	our	evidence.	
Any	 human	 who	 remains	 steadfast	 in	 good	 cases	 thereby	 manifests	 some	
disposition	to	remain	steadfast	in	bad	cases	too.	
There	is	a	more	general	moral	to	be	drawn	here.	There	are	cases	 in	which	
your	 evidence	 supports	 a	 conclusion,	 and	gives	 you	propositional	 justification	 to	
believe	 it,	 although	 you	 are	 psychologically	 incapable	 of	 forming	 a	 doxastically	
justified	belief	that	is	properly	based	on	your	evidence.	We	should	therefore	reject	
the	doxastic	constraint	on	propositional	justification	stated	below:	
	
The	Doxastic	Constraint:	Necessarily,	you	have	propositional	justification	to	
believe	that	p	only	if	you	have	the	psychological	capacity	to	believe	that	p	in	
a	way	that	is	doxastically	justified.15	
	
There	 are	 independent	 reasons	 to	 reject	 the	 doxastic	 constraint.	 Suppose	 you’re	
given	 a	 reason-distorting	 drug	 that	 renders	 you	 temporarily	 incapable	 of	
responding	 rationally	 to	 your	 evidence.	Whatever	 doxastic	 attitudes	 you	 adopt,	
they	are	guaranteed	to	be	doxastically	unjustified.	It	seems	absurd	to	suppose	that																																																									
14	I	don’t	claim	that	an	 ideally	rational	agent	must	be	 immune	from	hypoxia.	But	
we	can	ignore	bad	cases	in	which	she	suffers	from	hypoxia,	since	this	changes	her	
reasoning	dispositions	in	ways	that	make	them	less	than	ideally	rational.	
15	Proponents	of	the	Doxastic	Constraint	include	Goldman	(1979)	and	Turri	(2010).	
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merely	 ingesting	 this	 drug	 undermines	 your	 propositional	 justification	 to	 adopt	
any	doxastic	attitude	at	all.	There	 is	always	some	doxastic	attitude	that	you	have	
propositional	justification	to	hold	towards	any	given	proposition.	If	your	evidence	
is	not	strong	enough	to	justify	either	belief	or	disbelief,	then	you	have	justification	
to	remain	agnostic	by	default.	Even	so,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	you	are	always	
psychologically	 capable	 of	 forming	 a	 doxastic	 attitude	 that	 is	 properly	 based	 on	
what	 your	 evidence	 supports.	 After	 all,	 you	 might	 just	 have	 ingested	 a	 reason-
distorting	drug.	
The	natural	thing	to	say	about	the	reason-distorting	drug	is	that	it	impairs	
your	 epistemic	 rationality.	 It	 prevents	 you	 from	 properly	 basing	 your	 beliefs	 on	
your	evidence	and	thereby	converting	your	propositional	justification	into	doxastic	
justification.	 If	 there	 are	 doxastic	 constraints	 on	 propositional	 justification,	
however,	 then	we	 cannot	 say	 this.	We	must	 say	 instead	 that	 ingesting	 the	 drug	
somehow	changes	what	you	have	propositional	justification	to	believe.	But	this	is	
hard	 to	 reconcile	 with	 the	 evidentialist	 thesis	 that	 you	 have	 propositional	
justification	 to	believe	whatever	 is	 sufficiently	 supported	by	your	evidence,	 since	
ingesting	 the	 drug	 doesn’t	 change	 what	 your	 evidence	 is	 or	 what	 it	 supports.	
Moreover,	it	loses	sight	of	the	intuitive	idea	that	ingesting	the	drug	compromises	
your	 epistemic	 rationality	 by	 preventing	 you	 from	 responding	 appropriately	 to	
your	evidence.	
On	a	plausible	version	of	evidentialism,	there	are	no	doxastic	constraints	on	
propositional	 justification.	 What	 your	 evidence	 supports	 is	 one	 thing,	 but	 it’s	
another	 issue	entirely	whether	or	not	you’re	capable	of	 responding	appropriately	
by	forming	beliefs	that	are	not	only	supported	by	your	evidence,	but	also	properly	
based	 on	 your	 evidence.	One	 theoretical	 cost	 of	 conflating	 these	 questions	 is	 to	
obscure	the	epistemic	function	of	higher-order	evidence.	
	
5. Non-Ideal	Rationality	
Any	 plausible	 account	 of	 the	 epistemic	 function	 of	 higher-order	 evidence	 must	
explain	two	intuitive	data	points	about	the	hypoxia	example:	
	
(1) The	Negative	Datum:	You	cannot	know	or	rationally	believe	that	you	have	
enough	fuel	given	higher-order	evidence	that	you’re	hypoxic	
(2) The	Positive	Datum:	You	are	rationally	required	to	withhold	belief	that	you	
have	enough	fuel	given	higher-order	evidence	that	you’re	hypoxic.	
	
I	 explained	 the	 negative	 datum	 in	 §4,	 but	 this	 is	 not	 yet	 to	 explain	 the	 positive	
datum.	 After	 all,	 a	 reason-distorting	 drug	 might	 prevent	 you	 from	 rationally	
believing	 what	 your	 evidence	 supports	 without	 thereby	 imposing	 any	 rational	
requirement	to	refrain	from	believing	what	your	evidence	supports.	Indeed,	there	
is	 something	 puzzling	 about	 the	 very	 idea	 of	 such	 a	 requirement.	 According	 to	
evidentialism,	epistemic	rationality	is	simply	a	matter	of	proportioning	your	beliefs	
to	your	evidence.	So	how	can	epistemic	rationality	ever	require	you	to	refrain	from	
believing	what	your	evidence	supports?	
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To	answer	this	question,	we	need	a	distinction	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	
standards	 of	 epistemic	 rationality. 16 	By	 ideal	 standards,	 epistemic	 rationality	
always	 requires	 respecting	 your	 evidence.	 This	 is	 an	 epistemic	 ideal	 that	
sometimes	falls	beyond	our	limited	human	capacities:	we	are	not	always	capable	of	
rationally	following	our	evidence	where	it	leads.	Moreover,	we	know	this	–	at	any	
rate,	 we	 should	 know	 this	 –	 since	 we	 all	 have	 compelling	 evidence	 of	 our	 own	
cognitive	 limitations.	 By	 non-ideal	 standards,	 in	 contrast,	 epistemic	 rationality	
sometimes	requires	responding	to	such	evidence	by	adopting	policies	that	diverge	
from	 the	 epistemic	 ideal.	 In	 particular,	we	 are	 sometimes	 required	 by	 non-ideal	
standards	 to	 “bracket”	 our	 first-order	 evidence	 when	 we	 have	 higher-order	
evidence	that	we	cannot	reliably	follow	our	first-order	evidence	where	it	leads.	
This	is	what	happens	in	the	hypoxia	example.	When	you	acquire	the	higher-
order	evidence	that	you	cannot	respond	rationally	to	your	first-order	evidence,	you	
are	required	to	“bracket”	this	evidence	and	refrain	from	believing	what	it	supports	
–	namely,	that	you	have	enough	fuel.	Given	evidence	of	cognitive	impairment,	the	
sensible	 strategy	 is	 to	 become	 agnostic,	 rather	 than	 trying	 to	 believe	what	 your	
evidence	supports.	On	this	view,	the	epistemic	function	of	higher-order	evidence	is	
not	to	defeat	your	first-order	evidence	and	thereby	to	affect	which	conclusions	are	
supported	 by	 your	 total	 evidence.	 Rather,	 it	 determines	which	 response	 to	 your	
evidence	is	required	by	non-ideal	standards	of	epistemic	rationality.	
This	 is	 an	 instance	of	 a	much	more	general	point.	 It	doesn’t	 always	make	
sense	 to	 try	 to	do	what	you	know	would	be	best	 if	only	you	succeed	 in	doing	 it.	
After	all,	you	sometimes	know	–	or	have	good	evidence	–	that	your	attempt	to	do	
the	best	 thing	may	not	 succeed.	 In	 such	 cases,	 trying	 to	do	 the	best	 thing	often	
risks	a	worse	outcome	than	would	be	achieved	by	settling	for	second	best.	Hence,	
what	 is	best	by	 ideal	standards	 is	not	always	what	 is	best	by	non-ideal	standards	
that	take	into	account	your	evidence	about	your	own	limitations.	
We	can	articulate	this	general	point	more	precisely	within	the	framework	of	
rule	 consequentialism,	which	evaluates	rules	by	their	expected	consequences.	We	
can	evaluate	rules	in	a	way	that	is	sensitive	to	the	distinction	between	following	a	
rule	and	merely	trying	to	follow	a	rule.	Following	a	rule	is	a	kind	of	achievement:	
merely	trying	to	the	follow	the	rule	doesn’t	guarantee	that	you	will	succeed.	When	
you	 have	 evidence	 that	 you	 might	 fail,	 the	 expected	 consequences	 of	 trying	 to	
follow	 a	 rule	 can	 diverge	 from	 those	 of	 successfully	 following	 the	 rule.	 In	 such	
cases,	the	best	rule	to	follow	is	not	always	the	best	rule	to	try	to	follow.17	
Consider	Professor	Procrastinate	who	 is	 invited	to	review	a	book.18	He	has	
three	options	available,	which	are	listed	below	in	rank	order	from	best	to	worst:	
	
(1) Accept	the	invitation	and	complete	the	review	on	time.	
(2) Decline	the	invitation.																																																									
16	Compare	Smithies	(2015;	2019:	Ch.	10;	forthcoming)	for	this	distinction.	
17	Compare	Lasonen-Aarnio	(2010:	14-15)	and	Schoenfield	(2015:	650-3).	
18	The	example	is	from	Jackson	and	Pargetter	(1986).	
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(3) Accept	the	invitation	and	fail	to	complete	the	review	on	time.	
	
Which	 option	 should	 he	 take?	 There	 is	 no	 single	 answer	 to	 this	 question,	 since	
deontic	modals	in	ordinary	language	are	highly	context-sensitive.	There	is	a	sense	
in	which	he	should	accept	the	invitation	and	complete	the	review	on	time,	since	he	
knows	this	is	the	best	possible	outcome.	But	he	also	knows	(or	has	good	evidence)	
that	he	won’t	complete	the	review	on	time:	if	he	tries	to	achieve	the	best	outcome,	
then	he	is	more	likely	to	bring	about	the	worst	outcome.19	Hence,	there	is	a	sense	
in	which	he	should	decline	the	invitation.	Rather	than	trying	to	do	what	is	best,	it	
makes	more	sense	to	settle	 for	second	best.	By	 ideal	standards,	he	should	accept	
the	 invitation	and	complete	the	review	on	time,	whereas	by	non-ideal	standards,	
he	should	decline.	
We	can	capture	this	distinction	in	the	framework	of	rule-consequentialism.	
Rule	(1)	is	the	best	rule	to	follow,	but	it	is	not	the	best	rule	to	try	to	follow.	After	
all,	 the	 expected	 consequence	 of	 trying	 to	 follow	Rule	 (1)	 is	 that	 he	will	 end	 up	
following	Rule	(3)	instead.	The	expected	consequence	of	trying	to	follow	Rule	(2),	
however,	is	that	he	will	succeed.	And	there	is	greater	expected	value	in	following	
Rule	 (2)	 than	Rule	 (3).	Hence,	 there	 is	greater	expected	value	 in	 trying	 to	 follow	
Rule	 (2)	 than	 Rule	 (1),	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 greater	 expected	 value	 in	
successfully	 following	Rule	 (1)	 than	Rule	 (2).	This	 is	why	 ideal	 standards	 require	
following	Rule	(1),	although	non-ideal	standards	require	following	Rule	(2).	
When	we’re	 evaluating	 epistemic	 rules,	 we’re	 concerned	 solely	 with	 their	
expected	epistemic	consequences.	And	when	we’re	evaluating	them	for	epistemic	
rationality,	we’re	specifically	concerned	with	their	expected	consequences	for	how	
well	 you	 succeed	 in	 proportioning	 your	 beliefs	 to	 your	 evidence. 20 	From	 an	
evidentialist	 perspective,	 the	 best	 rule	 to	 follow	 is	 the	 evidentialist	 rule,	 “Always	
proportion	your	beliefs	to	your	evidence!”	By	ideal	standards,	epistemic	rationality	
always	requires	following	the	evidentialist	rule.	
Since	 we	 are	 not	 perfectly	 rational	 agents,	 however,	 we	 are	 not	 always	
capable	 of	 following	 the	 evidentialist	 rule.	Moreover,	 this	 is	 not	 always	 the	 best	
rule	 to	 try	 to	 follow	 when	 you	 have	 evidence	 that	 you	 may	 fail.	 There	 may	 be	
greater	 expected	 epistemic	 value	 in	 trying	 to	 follow	 some	 alternative	 rule,	 since	
you	 are	 likely	 to	manifest	more	 evidence-sensitive	 dispositions	 by	 adopting	 this	
alternative	strategy.	In	such	cases,	trying	to	follow	the	evidentialist	rule	is	a	kind	of	
self-sabotage:	it’s	a	counterproductive	strategy	for	maximizing	your	responsiveness																																																									
19	As	far	as	I	can	discern,	it	makes	no	difference	whether	his	evidence	is	misleading.	
Perhaps	there	are	contexts	in	which	our	intuitions	about	what	people	ought	to	do	
track	their	actual	tendencies,	rather	than	their	evidence	about	them,	but	there	are	
also	contexts	in	which	it	is	their	evidence	that	matters.	
20 	In	 contrast,	 Lasonen-Aarnio	 (2010)	 is	 concerned	 with	 expected	 epistemic	
consequences	for	knowledge,	while	Schoenfield	(2015)	is	concerned	with	expected	
accuracy,	whereas	 I	 am	concerned	with	expected	epistemic	 rationality	 construed	
as	responsiveness	to	evidence.	
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to	 evidence.	 This	 is	 why	 you	 are	 sometimes	 required	 by	 non-ideal	 standards	 of	
epistemic	rationality	to	refrain	from	believing	what	your	evidence	supports.	
Now	let’s	apply	this	distinction	to	the	hypoxia	example.	When	you	receive	
the	higher-order	evidence	that	you	are	hypoxic,	you	have	three	options:	
	
(1) Steadfastness:	Maintain	 your	 first-order	 belief	 that	 you	 have	 enough	 fuel	
and	 also	 your	 higher-order	 belief	 that	 your	 evidence	 supports	 this	
conclusion.	
	
(2) Level	 Splitting:	Maintain	your	first-order	belief	that	you	have	enough	fuel,	
but	 abandon	 your	 higher-order	 belief	 that	 your	 evidence	 supports	 this	
conclusion.	
	
(3) Conciliation:	Abandon	your	first-order	belief	that	you	have	enough	fuel	and	
also	your	higher-order	belief	that	your	evidence	supports	this	conclusion.	
	
Which	option	should	you	take?	Again,	there	is	no	single	answer	this	question.	By	
ideal	 standards,	 you	 should	 follow	 Steadfastness,	 since	 this	 is	 the	 best	 rule	 to	
follow:	 the	 expected	 consequence	 of	 successfully	 following	 this	 rule	 is	 that	 your	
beliefs	 are	 proportioned	 to	 your	 evidence.	 By	non-ideal	 standards,	 however,	 you	
should	follow	Conciliation,	since	this	is	the	best	rule	to	try	to	follow.	As	I’ll	explain,	
there	 is	 greater	 expected	 epistemic	 value	 in	 trying	 to	 follow	 Conciliation	 than	
either	Steadfastness	or	Level	Splitting.21	
The	expected	consequence	of	trying	to	follow	Steadfastness	is	that	you	will	
be	 like	 the	 steadfast	 pilot.22	As	we	 saw	 in	§4,	 the	 steadfast	pilot	 cannot	know	or	
rationally	 believe	 that	 he	 has	 enough	 fuel	 whether	 or	 not	 he	 has	 higher-order	
evidence	that	he	is	hypoxic.	This	is	because	his	belief	is	held	dogmatically	in	a	way	
that	 is	 insufficiently	 sensitive	 to	 changes	 in	 what	 his	 evidence	 supports.	 He	 is	
disposed	to	maintain	his	belief	when	he	acquires	the	higher-order	evidence	that	it	
is	based	on	bad	reasoning.	And	he	is	disposed	to	maintain	his	belief	not	only	in	the	
good	 case	 in	which	 his	 higher-order	 evidence	 is	misleading,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 bad	
case	in	which	his	higher-order	evidence	is	accurate.	Dogmatic	beliefs	of	this	kind	
are	not	rational	enough	to	constitute	knowledge.	
In	 contrast,	 the	 expected	 consequence	 of	 trying	 to	 follow	 Conciliation	 is	
that	you	will	be	like	the	conciliatory	pilot.	The	conciliatory	pilot	rationally	believes	
and	knows	that	he	has	enough	fuel	before	acquiring	the	higher-order	evidence	that	
he	is	hypoxic,	so	long	as	he	is	disposed	to	become	agnostic	when	he	acquires	this	
higher-order	evidence.	Hence,	 there	 is	greater	expected	epistemic	value	 in	trying	
to	 follow	 Conciliation	 than	 Steadfastness:	 this	 strategy	 increases	 your	 expected	
degree	of	epistemic	rationality	by	making	your	beliefs	more	sensitive	to	changes	in																																																									
21	Schoenfield	(2015:	652)	gives	a	different	argument	for	the	same	conclusion.	
22	Similarly,	the	expected	consequence	of	trying	to	follow	Level	Splitting	is	that	you	
will	be	like	the	steadfast	pilot	at	level	one	and	the	conciliatory	pilot	at	level	two.	
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what	your	evidence	supports.	This	is	why	you	are	required	by	non-ideal	standards	
of	 epistemic	 rationality	 to	 become	 agnostic	 when	 you	 acquire	 the	 higher-order	
evidence	that	you	are	hypoxic.	 In	this	way,	we	can	explain	the	positive	datum	as	
well	as	the	negative	datum.	
In	summary,	the	epistemic	function	of	higher-order	evidence	is	not	only	to	
prevent	you	from	responding	properly	to	your	evidence	in	the	way	that	is	required	
by	 ideal	 standards	of	epistemic	rationality.	 It	also	affects	which	response	 to	your	
evidence	 is	 required	 by	 non-ideal	 standards	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 that	 are	
sensitive	to	your	evidence	about	your	cognitive	limitations.	
	
6. Conclusions	
Let	 me	 conclude	 by	 summarizing	 the	 reasons	 for	 preferring	 my	 account	 of	 the	
epistemic	function	of	higher-order	evidence	to	the	alternatives	discussed	earlier	in	
this	chapter.	
First,	my	view	explains	the	 intuitive	datum	that	you	lose	knowledge	when	
you	acquire	 the	higher-order	evidence	 that	 you	are	hypoxic.	 In	 this	 respect,	 it	 is	
preferable	 to	 the	unreasonable	 knowledge	 view.	What	 this	 view	gets	 right	 is	 that	
the	steadfast	pilot	manifests	bad	dispositions	when	he	retains	his	belief	in	the	face	
of	misleading	higher-order	evidence.	What	it	gets	wrong	is	that	manifesting	these	
bad	 dispositions	 is	 compatible	with	 knowledge.	 The	 steadfast	 pilot	 doesn’t	 have	
knowledge	 because	 his	 dispositions	 are	 not	 sufficiently	 sensitive	 to	 changes	 in	
what	his	evidence	supports.	It’s	possible	in	principle	for	ideally	rational	agents	to	
retain	 knowledge	 in	 the	 face	 of	 misleading	 higher-order	 evidence,	 but	 this	 is	
impossible	in	practice	for	non-ideal	agents	like	us.	
Second,	 my	 view	 explains	 this	 intuitive	 datum	 without	 distorting	 the	
structure	of	the	evidential	support	relation	in	ways	that	compromise	the	objective	
constraints	imposed	by	logic	and	probability	theory.	In	this	respect,	it	is	preferable	
to	 the	evidential	 defeat	view.	What	 this	view	gets	 right	 is	 that	your	knowledge	 is	
destroyed	when	you	acquire	the	higher-order	evidence	that	you	are	hypoxic.	What	
it	 gets	 wrong	 is	 that	 this	 is	 to	 be	 explained	 by	 a	 change	 in	what	 your	 evidence	
supports.	 My	 view	 explains	 how	 you	 can	 lose	 your	 knowledge	 of	 a	 conclusion	
without	 losing	 your	 evidential	 support	 for	 that	 conclusion.	 Misleading	 higher-
order	 evidence	 can	 prevent	 you	 from	properly	 basing	 your	 beliefs	 on	what	 your	
total	evidence	supports.	
Third,	 my	 view	 explains	 this	 intuitive	 datum	 without	 any	 bifurcation	
between	 substantive	 and	 structural	 requirements	of	 epistemic	 rationality.	 In	 this	
respect,	it	is	preferable	to	the	epistemic	conflict	view.	What	this	view	gets	right	is	
that	epistemic	rationality	somehow	requires	“bracketing”	your	first-order	evidence	
when	you	have	misleading	higher-order	evidence.	What	is	gets	wrong	is	that	this	is	
because	 your	 total	 evidence	 supports	 incoherent	 beliefs.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 is	
because	misleading	higher-order	evidence	prevents	non-ideal	agents	from	properly	
basing	their	beliefs	on	their	evidence.	As	a	result,	 they	are	required	by	non-ideal	
standards	 of	 epistemic	 rationality	 to	 manage	 their	 cognitive	 limitations	 by	
adopting	policies	that	deviate	from	the	epistemic	ideal	of	respecting	the	evidence.	
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The	“rationally	toxic”	nature	of	higher-order	evidence	is	best	explained	in	terms	of	
a	 distinction	 between	 ideal	 and	 non-ideal	 requirements	 of	 epistemic	 rationality,	
rather	 than	 a	 distinction	 between	 substantive	 and	 structural	 requirements	 of	
epistemic	rationality.	
In	 conclusion,	 my	 proposal	 accommodates	 the	 intuitive	 data	 about	 the	
epistemic	 function	of	higher-order	evidence	with	minimal	 theoretical	mutilation.	
We	can	explain	why	you	should	conciliate	in	response	to	misleading	higher-order	
evidence	without	abandoning	evidentialism	or	compromising	the	objective	logical	
and	probabilistic	 constraints	on	 the	evidential	 support	 relation.	The	key	point	 is	
that	we	are	not	always	capable	of	rationally	believing	what	our	evidence	supports.	
Moreover,	 we	 sometimes	 know	 or	 have	misleading	 evidence	 that	 we	 are	 in	 this	
unfortunate	predicament.	In	such	cases,	we	should	adopt	strategies	for	managing	
our	epistemic	 limitations	 that	deviate	 from	the	epistemic	 ideal	of	believing	what	
our	 evidence	 supports.	 This	 is	 one	 instance	 of	 the	more	 general	 point	 that	 you	
shouldn’t	 always	 try	 to	 do	what	 is	 best	 when	 your	 efforts	 are	 likely	 to	 backfire.	
Sometimes,	you	should	settle	for	second-best.	
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